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Abstract
This study investigates to what degree trust affects the results in a choice task. In
the task, participants’ answers are sometimes manipulated, and we measure how
often this is detected. Participants were divided into three groups, each getting the
instructions from a different recorded voice which is more or less trustworthy. The
results show many kinds of differences between the groups, both in the detection
rate and how participants talk about the voices. The conclusion is that trust does
affect the outcome of this task, but also that participants can be affected by self-
censorship such as political correctness.
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 1 Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate how the results of a simple choice task
are affected by the participants’ trust in the experimenter.
In the original version of this choice task, participants were shown pairs of pho-
tographs of female faces, and their task was simply to choose which face they
found most attractive. The participants were then shown the face they had just
chosen, and at times they were asked to further motivate their choice. On a few
occasions,  however,  the  experimenter  performed  a  concealed  card  trick  and
switched the two photographs. The participants were thus shown the face they had
not chosen, but were asked “Why did you choose this face?”. The remarkable re-
sults are that 3 out of 4 times participants failed to detect this manipulation. This
phenomenon is  called  choice blindness (Johansson et  al  2005,  Johansson et  al
2007).
A central hypothesis for explaining the phenomenon of choice blindness con-
cerns  participants’  trust.  Firstly,  their  trust  in  the  invariability  of  the  physical
environment is likely to make them unaware of the card trick. Secondly, they are
likely to trust the experimenter not to tamper or manipulate the results. Therefore,
when  participants  are  asked  to  motivate  the  manipulated  choices  they uncon-
sciously confabulate reasons for choosing a face that they in fact did not choose.
It is well-known that humans readily extract information from voices, such as
the speaker’s gender, origin, emotional state etc. This process is highly automatic
and operates on genuine human voices as well as on recorded voices in computer
interfaces (Reeves & Nass 1996, Nass & Brave 2005). The information we extract
from a voice helps us to form conceptions about other people, ultimately affecting
our trust in the speaker and the message. People generally prefer people that are
like themselves – the in-group – over people who differ in some relevant aspect –
the out-group. Language and accent is one such highly relevant aspect (Schneider
2004, Dahlbäck et al 2007).
In order to test the hypothesis about trust, we created a computer version of the
choice task in which all instructions were given by a recorded voice – the ‘digital
experimenter’. 60 participants were divided into three groups, and each of these
heard the instructions spoken with a different accent. This allows the digital ex-
perimenter to become more or less similar to the participants and therefore more
or less trustworthy. After the choice task, the participants are also asked to assess
how much trust they had in the experimenter’s voice.
Assuming that trust is a factor behind choice blindness we predict that the num-
ber  of  detected  manipulations  will  differ  between  the  groups,  and  that  the
explicitly assessed trust will show an inverse correlation with the number of de-
tected manipulations.
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 2 Background
 2.1 The Media Equation
The most fundamental theory behind this thesis is the equation Media = Real Life.
This equation, the conclusion of thirty-five studies conducted over several years,
was presented in 1996 by Byron Reeves and Clifford Nass in their book The Me-
dia Equation. The equation means that human beings react to and interact with
media in fundamentally the same way as they react to and interact with other hu-
man beings. Among other things, studies in the book showed that we respond to
reality and filmed reality with the same kind of emotions, and we direct our atten-
tion  to  movement  on  a  screen  just  as  we  direct  it  towards  real  objects.
Furthermore, we treat computer interfaces similarly to how we treat other people:
we ascribe personality traits to them and we are polite to them. The social conven-
tions governing our everyday behavior carry over into media – from simple drawn
animations  and  written  text  up  to  high-quality  photographs  and  high-fidelity
sound recordings (Reeves & Nass 1996).
At first, this idea can seem counterintuitive and absurd, even insulting. As edu-
cated  adults,  familiar  with  these  media,  we  all  know that  computers  and
televisions lack emotions and feelings. We know that a photograph is just a gather-
ing of pigments on paper. We know that the movie we are watching is ultimately a
transparent celluloid reel projected onto a screen, accompanied by sound created
by vibrating diaphragms. Still, most of us have at some point tried to interact with
a computer, printer or television; from a pleading “Come on, it can’t take this long
…” to “You piece of crap! I swear, if you give me one more paper jam, you’re go-
ing straight out the window!”. Cartoons, books and even photographs can make us
laugh or cry, and a good horror movie or thriller affects us in the same way that a
tangible physical threat would do.
Some people find it hard to accept that there is such a discrepancy beween our
sensible reasoning and our actual reactions and behaviour. So, perhaps this phe-
nomenon applies only to children who are still too young and unexperienced to
tell the difference between media and reality? Perhaps it applies to people in the
Papuan highlands or the Amazon jungle who are largely unfamiliar with these
modern media? Reeves and Nass refute this as well: throughout their studies they
found that the Media Equation applies to everyone: children and adults, moviego-
ers and readers, computer novices and computer experts. 
The media equation can be overcome, people can treat media as a mere repre-
sentation of the real world – but they tend not to. This type of detachment always
requires “a lot of effort […] and [it is] always difficult to sustain. The automatic
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response is  to accept  what  seems to  be real  as  in  fact  real.”  (Reeves  & Nass
1996:8).
 2.1.1 The method behind the media equation
The studies conducted by Reeves & Nass were all based on earlier studies of hu-
man  interaction  and  behavior  from the  domain  of  social  science:  psychology,
sociology and communication. Before repeating these studies, one simple yet cru-
cial alteration was made: wherever a study mentioned a principle or conclusion
about human behaviour,  words like ‘person’ or  ‘environment’ were substituted
with different kinds of media, e.g. “people like to be praised by other people” be-
came “people like to be praised by computers”. The study’s method and material
were then altered in order to make it possible to investigate these conclusions.
It is important to be aware that Reeves & Nass started their research with the in-
tention to find out more about how humans interact with computers, and not to
find proof for one specific hypothesis. They readily admit that in the beginning of
their research they had no formulated media equation, they rather “believed that
people  might  occasionally  confuse  media  and  real  life”  but  that  such  a  phe-
nomenon would be both limited and “curable”, i.e. that the more someone has
been exposed to media the easier he would have to separate media and reality
(Reeves & Nass 1996:6).
 2.1.2 The theory behind the media equation
Our human brain is simply “not evolved to twentieth-century technology” (Reeves
& Nass 1996:12), it still reacts with the vital ‘automatic responses’ that have been
refined over millions of years in a world without any media. The mammal brain
has been evolving over 200 million years,  and our social skills as primates go
back millions  of  years.  Special  human skills  such  as  language go  back  about
200,000 years.
Given this timeframe, media is something very new. The more advanced ‘cap-
turing’ media like photography, film and sound recording are no older than 200
years. Througout our entire evolution it has been a simple truth that if something
looks, acts or sounds like a human, it  is a human. This is a very simple rule that
was once applicable to our every sensory input.
As mentioned earlier, it takes a lot of conscious effort to set aside these strong
ancient automatic responses, and this ‘detached’ state of mind is hard to sustain.
As an example, it is very difficult for someone to distance himself from a scary
movie and at the same time keep track of the plot.
Designers of media and interfaces can benefit greatly from these findings. Instead
of thinking of media as tools or mere representations of reality, designers can both
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simplify and improve interaction and interfaces by letting the human social exper-
tise become relevant in media interaction.
 2.2 Humans are ‘voice-activated’
By the end of the 1990’s, loudspeakers and even microphones had become inte-
gral  parts  of  any  home computer,  facilitating  the  spread  and  development  of
voice-interfaces. This led Clifford Nass and his new colleague Scott Brave to fo-
cus their research on speech, the most social of all our human skills. Humans are
experts at analyzing voices to quickly extract ‘social cues’ such as a speaker’s
gender, age and emotional state. The speaker’s choice of words and syntactical
constructions often provides further social cues, e.g. ‘A mistake was made’ can be
perceived as more evasive than ‘I made a mistake’, and ‘Give me a beer’ is ruder
than ‘Could I have a beer, please?’.
Again, researchers designed and conducted experiments that were similar to so-
cial  science  experiments  concerning  human  interaction.  Subjects  ranged  from
stereotyping of gender and ethnicity to the perception of emotion and personality
in a voice. These studies were gathered in the book  Wired for Speech (Nass &
Brave 2005).
As the media equation would predict, the results showed that we perceive and
react to talking and listening media as if they were living human beings. The sug-
gested explanation is also similar to what was suggested in the media equation: we
have “brains that are wired to equate voices with people” and we “cannot suppress
[our] natural responses to speech, regardless of source” (Nass & Brave 2005:3ff).
Indeed, when our brain processes genuine human speech it uses the same parts
and functions as it does when it processes recorded and even computer-generated
speech of lower quality. Nass & Brave summarize this by saying that humans are
‘voice-activated’, meaning that both authentic voices and recorded voices activate
our natural responses to human speech.
 2.3 Choice blindness
Choice blindness is a phenomenon first described in 2005, and its name is derived
from the finding that  most people seem to be largely unaware of some of the
choices they make, or at least unable to detect when someone manipulates these
choices (Johansson et al 2005).
In the original study, the experimenter showed a participant two pictures of fe-
male faces and asked him to choose which face they found more attractive. At
intervals, the experimenter handed the participant the picture he had just chosen
and asked him to verbally motivate his choice. But, in a few of these cases the ex-
perimenter performed a card trick to manipulate the participant’s choice, handing
him the picture he had  not chosen. Including all mitigating circumstances (e.g.
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that once a participant has detected one card manipulation, he is more likely to de-
tect any ensuing ones) no more than 26% of the card manipulations were detected.
In other words, in 3 out of 4 times participants failed to detect the mismatch be-
tween choice and outcome, and instead they explained to the experimenter why
they had chosen the picture that they in fact did not choose.
 2.3.1 Trust as a reason behind choice blindness
One suggested reason behind choice blindness concerns our trust in the constancy
of our physical surroundings. Things generally remain the same, they do not radi-
cally change as in a card trick. One indication of this belief is that in the original
study 84% of the participants asserted that they would detect a manipulation of the
pictures (Johansson et al 2007). This was of course asked before the experimenter
revealed what had really happened. The actual result was that only 60% of the
participants detected all manipulations, and that was among the participants that
were given unlimited time to look at the two pictures. Among the participants that
were given 5 seconds to look at the pictures,  no one detected all the manipula-
tions.  Among those who looked for  only 2 seconds,  70% failed to detect  any
manipulation. (Johansson et al 2005). This discrepancy between introspective be-
lief and actual behavior is similar to the participants’ reactions in many of the
studies in The Media Equation.
As with the media equation, one could argue that our trust in the physical world
is a result of the environment in which we have evolved. Throughout literally bil-
lions  of  years,  inanimate  things  have  tended  to  stay  the  same.  This  simple
assumption has been succesful enough, allowing for cognitive resources to be di-
rected  to  more  important  and  changeable  things.  Living  creatures  in  all
environments take advantage of this assumption through camouflage.
Another kind of trust that is relevant in this case is the trust that participants
normally have in the experimenter. Most people will regard him as an authority
bound by ethical regulations, and therefore he is likely to be sincere about his in-
tentions with an experiment. This kind of trust can be considered to be culture-
specific, e.g. since clothing and other attributes that evoke trust vary greatly be-
tween cultures.
 2.3.2 Altering of trust
What would happen if the pictures of the female faces were not shown on tangi-
ble, physical cards but on a computer screen? Does the trust in the physical world
extend to the screen, or would a virtual environment make people more suspicious
or watchful, eventually making them detect more of the picture switchings?
This idea was put to the test through a computer version of the decision task, in
which a cartoon-like female experimenter showed pictures of female faces (Jo-
hansson et al 2007). The results support the hypothesis, since the detection rate in
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the digital experiment was somewhat higher than in the original experiment: 33%
vs. 26%. However, the computer version of the experiment did not use the same
set of pictures that were used in the original experiment, so the results from the
two tests are unfortunately not statistically comparable.
Figure 1. Layout of the original experiment in Johansson et al 2005
Figure 2. A screenshot from the digital experiment in Johansson et al 2007
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The participants’ trust in the experimenter is also something that can be varied.
The experimenter could borrow attributes that normally evoke distrust or watch-
fulness, e.g. a magician top hat and a wand.
 2.3.3 How is trust measured?
In studies of trust one way of measuring is to let a participant perform a task or in-
teract with an interface and then answer gradable questions about his experience,
giving a so called  explicit assessment. This is often followed by an interview or
‘debriefing’ about the experiment,  where the participant  can give further  com-
ments.
Another kind of measurement is implicit assessment where for example partici-
pants  are  given advice on how to perform a task.  Their  level  of  trust  can be
deduced and measured from how faithfully they follow the advice.
Assuming trust to be a factor behind choice blindness implies that the number of
detected manipulations is an implicit assessment of the participants’ trust in the
experimenter and the virtual environment. Manipulated choice tests could then be
used as a method for attaining gradable results without having to rely on explicit
assessments such as retrospective questionnaires or interviews, which are demon-
strably  unreliable.  Furthermore,  as  in  this  study,  the  numbers  of  detected
manipulations can be compared with the participants’ answers in a questionnaire
or interview to see if there is any correlation.
 2.4 We trust people that are like us
 2.4.1 What makes a voice trustworthy?
Many studies  have  investigated  the  cross-linguistic  acoustic  patterns  of  ‘basic
emotions’ such as fear, anger, joy and sadness. The measured voice parameters
usually include intensity, duration, speech rate, pitch variability and pitch mean
(Scherer 2003). However, a voice’s trustworthiness is a much more complex issue,
going beyond mere acoustic patterns.
One of the most basic concepts in trust and distrust is group belonging. People
trust and favor those who are perceived as belonging to the same group (the in-
group) but distrust and disfavor those who are perceived as belonging to other
groups (the  out-group).  This categorization of people and the subsequent treat-
ment of them is not only an observation that most of us have made in daily life but
a well-established topic of research within social psychology and other branches
of cognitive science.
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The most influential theory about the ‘in-group bias’ is Henri Tajfel’s Social Iden-
tity Theory (SIT). This theory argues that our social identity is mainly a product of
our group-belongings, and it is therefore in everyone’s best interest to regard his
own groups as positive and to act favourable within them in order to strengthen
solidarity.
The theory’s indirect explanation of hostility towards out-groups is that one of
the easiest, and most common, ways of maintaining a notion of superiority and
distinctiveness is to lessen and estrange other groups (Schneider 2004:233f).
Depending on the situation, a person will perceive his membership in certain in-
groups as more important than others. Our most basic and involuntary group-be-
longings such as gender, ethnicity and mother tongue are usually also the most
salient and important ones. When the importance of in-groups varies, the impor-
tance of the corresponding out-groups changes accordingly.
 2.4.2 Groups and trust in voice-interfaces
A famous example of group mismatching within voice interfaces is a talking in-
car navigation system from BMW which was launched with a female interface
voice. German drivers were “untrusting of a female voice giving directions” and
the product  was recalled and reworked to better  suit  the characteristics  of  the
‘BMW driver’ group (Nass & Brave 2005:55f).
Among the studies in Wired for Speech, the one that focused most on trust was a
study, similar to this one, about English accents in an e-commerce interface. This
interface provided spoken descriptions of four products, all recorded with both an
Australian accent and a Korean accent. The recordings also included a few accent-
specific phrases like ‘G’day mate’ and ‘Annyong haseyo’.
The participants in this study were divided into two groups consisting of White
Americans and first-generation Koreans. Half of the participants in each group
were presented with the Australian accent description, and the others were pre-
sented with the Korean accent description. After listening, the participants rated
the credibility of the descriptions using different adjectives, including ‘trustwor-
thy’. The results showed that the participants put more trust into the descriptions
that  were  given  in  the  accent  that  most  resembled  their  own  (Nass  & Brave
2005:61ff).
Another  similar  study  was  made  with  English  spoken  with  American  and
Swedish accents, and the American and Swedish participants showed the same
preference for the in-group accent, even when the Swedish accent gave informa-
tion about New York and the American accent gave information about Stockholm
(Dahlbäck  et  al  2007).  A study  with  American  English  and  English  with  a
Japanese accent reached similar results (Cargile & Giles 1997).
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Dialects or accents also vary in their trustworthiness, and such opinions have ob-
viously developed as a result of historical and social factors that differ between
societies and language communities. In terms of how we perceive and regard oth-
ers, accent and dialect is just as important as gender or visual appearance. This
includes aspects such as trust and likeability (Gulz et al 2007).
Since people belong to many different groups simultaneously, a person can be a
‘Swedish speaker’ in a situation where other languages are present, but as soon as
only Swedish speakers are present, he might feel that his identity as a speaker of a
particular Swedish dialect becomes more relevant.
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 3 Material and Method
 3.1 Method
The experiment was designed as a between-participant experiment with 3 groups
of 20 participants each. All participants performed the same digital choice test, but
each one of the three groups were given the spoken instructions by a different
voice.
 3.2 Material
 3.2.1 Choice test
The digital choice test was in the form of a computer application. Instructions for
the test were given only in spoken form, uttered by a male voice. The participants
could hear the initial instructions over again by clicking a button.
 3.2.2 Photos
This version of the choice test used 30 color photographs of female faces. These
photographs had not been used in earlier choice tests.
 3.2.3 Voices
The three different male voices used in this study were all recordings of the same
man, a training actor. The voices were recorded using the same script so they all
uttered the same words.
We call  the  first  voice  Standard  Swedish since  it  spoke  Standard  Swedish
(‘rikssvenska’), an accent deemed neutral and therefore typically used on stage, in
newscasts and in instructional messages.
The  second  voice  is  called  Fishy  Swedish.  It  spoke  Swedish  with  a  dark,
wheezy Stockholm accent. This kind of accent has connotations of alcoholism and
criminality.
The third voice is called Broken Swedish. It spoke Swedish with a mix of Polish
and Russian accents. This accent manifested itself mostly in intonation but also in
individual sounds (such as replacing [h] with a harsher [x] or pronouncing long
a’s [ɑ] as [a]). This  voice was recorded with the same script as the two preced-
ing voices, so it used the same words and uttered no ungrammatical constructions.
Earlier digital experimenters have sometimes been very repetitive, something that
can strain the participant’s concentration and interest. In this flash application no
soundclip was ever repeated, but instead each image pair had its own designated
soundclip with the occasional comment like “now we have gone through half of
the image pairs” or “here comes the next to last image pair”.
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 3.2.4 Questionnaire
This questionnaire was based on the questionnaire that was embedded in the com-
puter application used in Johansson et al 2007. In this study it was used in a face-
to-face interview and extended with questions about the voice.
 3.3 Participants
The 60 participants (31 female) were all native speakers of Swedish and most of
them came from southern Sweden (from or south of Stockholm). This makes them
members of the ‘speakers of Swedish’ group. The average age was 23.5 with a
median age of 22.5.
 3.4 Procedure
 3.4.1 Pretence
In order to make participants disregard the experimenter’s voice, they were told
that the experiment was part of a study about the attractiveness of female faces.
 3.4.2 Choice test
After the participants had arrived they were told that the computer would give
them their instructions and were then left alone in the room with the computer to
perform the choice test. A randomization script decided which voice the partici-
pant heard.
After hearing the initial instructions, the participants were presented with a total
of 15 image pairs, each being shown for 5 seconds. On 6 occasions they were
asked to further motivate their choice by indicating the importance (much, a little,
not at all, not sure) of certain facial features (face, eyes, hair, smile). There was
also a text field for additional written comments. 3 of these 6 image pairs were
manipulated (trials 7, 10 and 14).
After the participants had seen, chosen and motivated the pictures, the digital
experimenter’s voice thanked them for their participation and said good bye.
 3.4.3 Questionnaire
The participants then joined the experimenter in an adjacent room for a short in-
terview with both general questions and gradable questions.
The first question was a very general question about the experiment and about
how interesting the participants had found it. After that came questions about the
voice,  first  the  more  general  “What  did  you  think  about  the  experimenter’s
voice?” and then “Did you have confidence in the voice?”.  This  question was
gradable from 1 (weak confidence) to 4 (strong confidence).
Thereafter came two questions which allowed the participant to reveal any de-
tection of pictures being switched.  The first  question was the general  question
“Did you feel that anything was strange about this experiment?”. If the partici-
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pants  had not  shown any sign  of  detection at  this  point,  they were  asked  the
tongue-in-cheek question “Next week we will perform a study similar to this one,
but we will secretly switch the pictures so that people are asked to motivate the
picture they didn’t choose. Do you think that you would detect such a change?”.
The participants were then asked to grade how likely it was that they would detect
this, from 1 (I don’t think I would) to 4 (I’m certain I would).
Finally came the disclosure that  the pictures had been switched already this
time, and the question “Did you detect it?”. If the answer was positive, the final
gradable question was “How many times did you detect it?”.
Directly after this, the experimenter assured the participants that it was rare for
people to detect the switch. The final questions concerned the participants’ mother
tongue and whether they had seen or heard about this experiment before. Finally,
the participants signed a form of consent.
The reason for doing the interview with a human experimenter in another room
goes back to one of the studies in  The Media Equation, namely that humans are
polite to computers just as they are to other people (Reeves & Nass 1996:19ff). In
order to make our participants feel free to evaluate the experiment and the voice
with  full  honesty,  we  distanced  them  first  from  the  computer  experimenter
through its saying “good bye”, and secondly from the computer by doing the in-
terview in another room.
One advantage of having a spoken, interview-like questionnaire over a paper
questionnaire is that the latter gives the experimenter no information about the
participants’ thoughts during the answering. If the participant has been completely
oblivious  about  the  picture  switching,  he  might  become  embarrased  once  he
reaches the final question. He might even go back and change his earlier answers
e.g. under the question “Did you feel that anything was strange about this experi-
ment?”.  In  an  interview,  on the other  hand,  the  experimenter  can  observe  the
participant’s reactions and often notice signs of doubt or certainty in his voice.
 3.5 Levels of detection
The layout of the experiment gave the participants several opportunities to show
that they had detected any pictures being switched. As in earlier versions of the
choice task, these opportunities are divided into ‘levels of detection’, with the first
level being the most important.
The first level is called ‘concurrent detection’ and applies to cases where partic-
ipants immediately report that the pictures had been switched or that ‘something
went wrong’. Participants are left alone during the experiment and can only report
in writing, therefore this level also includes comments that participants give di-
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rectly after the experiment is over, or as an answer to the first question “What did
you think of the experiment?”.
The second level is called ‘retrospective detection’ and it applies to cases where
participants reveal signs of detection in their answers to the question “Did you feel
that anything was strange about this experiment?” or to “Do you think that you
would detect such a change?”.
The third level is called ‘possible retrospective detection’ and applies to cases
where participants do not reveal any sign of detection until after the experimenter
has revealed that some pictures were switched. In these cases, the participants are
asked to describe the faces they claim have been manipulated.
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 4 Results
The  results  show  a  significant  difference  in  detection  rate  between  Standard
Swedish and the other  two groups,  something that  supports  our  initial  theory.
However, the explicit assessments do not correlate very well with the detection
rate.
Figure 3. The results from the study
The detection rate for the Standard Swedish voice was 48%, a high number
compared with earlier studies (see  5.2). As hypothesized, the detection rates for
the other two voices were even higher: 60% for Fishy Swedish and 63% for Bro-
ken Swedish.
The explicit assessment also divides the three voices into two groups, but not
along the same lines. The assessment, rated on a scale from 1 to 4, reaches only
2.5  for  Fishy  Swedish,  but  the  numbers  for  Standard  Swedish  and  Broken
Swedish show no significant difference, rated as 3.4 and 3.3 respectively.
17
48%
60%
63%
2.5
3.4 3.3
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Standard Swedish Fishy Swedish Broken Swedish
De
te
ct
io
n
 
Ra
te
1
2
3
4
Ex
pl
ic
it 
As
se
ss
m
en
t
Detection Rate Explicit Assessment
Figure 4. Detections divided into levels (see 3.5)
When the detections are divided into their three ‘levels of detection’ (as defined in
3.5), another distinctive pattern emerges. Not only do Fishy Swedish and Broken
Swedish have a higher detection rate, they also have a larger proportion of concur-
rent detections than Standard Swedish. A high number of concurrent detections
indicates that participants are watchful and suspicious.
The concurrent detections make up only 52% of the total number of detections
for Standard Swedish,  whereas they make up 81% of the detections for Fishy
Swedish and 74% for Broken Swedish.
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 5 Discussion
The results support the initial hypothesis in almost all aspects. The only deviation
is the case of Broken Swedish, for which the hypothesis predicts a lower explicit
assessment.
 5.1 Reactions to the voices
Standard Swedish and Broken Swedish received almost identical assessments, but
the participants’ comments about the two voices differed in nature.
Standard Swedish was often described as “nice”, “good” and “pleasant”. Other
common descriptions centered on its neutrality, and it was often called “the typical
voice used for instructions”. Some participants had to think for a while when an-
swering questions about this voice, simply because they had not reflected about it
at all.
Broken Swedish was also occasionally called “nice”, “pleasant” and “distinct”.
However, many participants said that the voice was “atypical for this context” and
that they immediately had become aware of the accent.
Fishy Swedish was perceived as part fishy and part comical; most participants
smiled or laughed when they were asked about the voice. Some participants said
that it sounded like a hobo or a drug dealer, but just as many called it “entertain-
ing” or “funny” and likened it to various Swedish comedians and actors. What
these two views have in common is that they both perceive the Fishy Swedish
voice as unserious and extremely atypical for this context.
 5.1.1 Does political correctness affect the assessment?
One theory behind the unexpectedly high assessment of Broken Swedish is that
participants have censored themselves in order not to express opinions that others
might find offensive, i.e.  political correctness. The Concise Oxford English Dic-
tionary defines  political  correctness  as  ‘‘the  careful  avoidance  of  forms  of
expression or action that are perceived to exclude or insult groups of people who
are socially disadvantaged or discriminated against’’ (Soanes & Stevenson 2004).
The assessment ratings also go hand in hand with the comments that partici-
pants  gave:  Fishy  Swedish  received  several  explicitly  distrustful  comments
whereas Broken Swedish only received one such comment. Some participants also
asserted that they had “no problem with immigrant-Swedish”, even though they
had never said anything to the contrary. Participants would give such comments
both before and after they had learned the purpose of the study.
 5.1.2 What is it that we distrust?
Another theory concerns the detection rates rather than the assessments. If we as-
sume that the participants’ assessment are not affected by political correctness,
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then perhaps the detection rate does not reflect their trust in the  voices,  but in
something else?
Both Broken Swedish and Fishy Swedish were described as “atypical” or “non-
standard” voices for giving formal instructions, and participants who heard these
voices often said that they reacted to this immediately. These voices in this partic-
ular context might have made participants suspicious of the situation rather than
suspicious of the individual voices. A suspicion towards the entire situation could
also be an explanation to why concurrent detections were so common for both
Broken Swedish and Fishy Swedish.
This theory would explain the actual results of this study, but at the same time it
conflicts with the many other studies showing that people trust people who sound
like themselves more than they trust others. Why is Fishy Swedish, spoken by a
native albeit atypical voice, assessed much lower than Broken Swedish, and why
is Broken Swedish rated as equal to Standard Swedish? When this rather crucial
conflict with earlier studies is taken into consideration, the theory of political cor-
rectness seems more plausible. That theory would emphasize distrust in particular
voices as the explanation of the high levels of concurrent detections.
 5.2 Ability to compare with earlier studies
The comparisons within this study posed no problem, but it eventually became
clear that this study could not be directly compared with earlier studies since some
of the variables in the studies’ layout are incompatible.
To begin with, the photographs used in this study were shown in color, while
earlier studies had used grayscale photographs. Color adds more information to
the photographs, making it harder to confuse them with each other. Most of the
photographs also showed a little piece of clothing, so even if the faces are very
similar, the color of the clothes may differ in ways that would not have been dis-
cernible in grayscale.
Another thing to take into consideration is that the photographs used in this
study were shown bigger than the ones used in earlier studies. These two variables
combined form one possible explanation to why the detection rates were so high
in this experiment. Another possible contributing factor, as suggested in the intro-
duction, is that people trust a virtual environment less than they trust a tangible
physical environment.
 5.3 Conclusion
The results from this study strongly support the theory that trust is a factor behind
choice blindness, and they also corroborate the many earlier findings that show
that we trust voices that are similar to our own more than we trust other voices.
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The results also suggest that people’s assessment of trust can be affected by fac-
tors such as political correctness. This tendency stresses the need for a tool that
can obtain a measurable implicit assessment of trust, and choice blindness seems
to be such a tool.
The dimension of trust, and how it can be measured, should be further investi-
gated  in  between-group  studies.  There  are  many variables  that  can  be  varied:
gender, ethnicity, accent, and even clothing.
Once again it becomes obvious that software designers who develop voice in-
terfaces  should  always  investigate  what  kind  of  voice  fits  best  in  a  specific
situation. Especially when an application needs to establish a bond of trust with its
users, a wisely chosen voice is a crucial component.
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